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This is tne Management Journal. 
Its publication ts a result of the continuing interest of 
a stgnificant number of Management students and faculty 
members. 
The organi'zaUon and editori'al 'policies of the Journal 
are still sketchy, its distri6ution is extremely limited, 
and it is too early to predict even partial success. How--
ever, it ts hoped that this humf:>le effort ma.v 6e the 
catalyst that ultimately creates a first-class management 
publication. Surely, there is a need for such a puolica-
tion at the Naval Postgraduate Scliool, and it is considered 
that the faculty and students here are every bit as erudite 
as those at other institutions that now publish professional 
journals. 
It has been observed that many otherwise meritorious 
papers with a management message to impart often just die 
in some briefcase, desk, or file. We wish to capture these 
papers and given them continued life in the Management 
Journal. Accordingly, faculty members and students who 
have such papers are encouraged to forward them to the 
Editor of the Management Journal, C/0 of the Department of 
Business Administration and Economics for consideration for 
publication in the future. 
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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 
In the effort to expand and improve this editorial 
undertaking additional features have been added to this 
current is·sue of the Management Journal, one of which is 
the Letters to the Editor. Readers are encouraged to send 
their observations and comments, other than those entered 
on the Survey Questionnaire, to the Editor, Management 
Journal, C/0 Office of the Department of Business Admini-
stration and Economics. 
Editorial policy requires that such letters must be 
signed to be published although the signature will not be 
used upon request of the writer. Letters should relate 
to the broad general areas of management and be limited to 
two typewritten pages in length. 
V 
from: LCDR Allen E. Weseleskey, USN 
To: Editor, Management Journal 
Subj: A Letter to the Edltor Concerning a Management 
Laboratory 
The U. s. Navy takes great pride in its expanding edu-
cational endeavors within the Service. Many officers and 
men have accepted the challenge of education, both on and 
off duty, but I feel we have concentrated too much on the 
technical aspects, the scientific and quantitative approaches 
of learning. 
The finished product of our postgraduate system departs 
with an excellent stock of professional tools in his spe-
cialty but he is lacking in one vital ability, that is, 
presenting himself and his knowledge in a clear, concise, 
and illustrative, professional manner. The average naval 
officer rarely shows the ability to convey a polished, 
clear briefing, or presentation to a group, civilian or 
military. His knowledge of his subject may be second to 
none, yet his use of various training aids, graphics or 
charts is practically non-existent. 
The neglect of this area has, on occasion, had a crip-
pling effect on our service, and has cost us the ability 
to communicate well within our own service as well as to 
our sister services or, more important, our civilian execu-
tive and legislative leaders. 
The Naval Postgraduate School needs a Management 
Laboratory where these deficiencies can be rectified. Each 
naval officer should know what training aids are available 
to him and how he can effectively use them; he should be 
able to manufacture his own aids from available resources 
in many instances. He should be able to demonstrate a 
confidence in himself, his knowledge, and the Navy by the 
presentation of his material to any audience, military or 
civilian. What good is our knowledge if we cannot present 
it in a convincing manner that reflects our desires and 
goals? 
And in the same area of communications, where have we 
had the orientation to Public Affairs that CNO spoke of in 
his recent visit? If we are to progress to bigger and 
better jobs, more responsibilities, and so forth, we will 
surely have a growing contact with the public and the news 
media. The need for training on briefing techniques and 
fielding questions is two fold: (a) it has the aspect of 
individual career development and (b) the need to utilize 
every opportunity to enhance the Navy's image in the puhlic 
eye. Again our educational system has rendered the U.S. 
Naval officer deficient, in fact, a cripple and a detri-
ment to our own service and the Department of Defense, by 
vi 
not taking the opportunity· to acquaint hi.m wtth. the~e 
6asics of puhlic cornmuntcati:on. Are the sci.ence.s, the 
tecnntcal ori:entattons of thi:s tnstttutton so bl ind as to 
not recognize that with ju~t a ltttle more effort we can 
polish the precious gem that now-graduates from Monterey 
and put fortfi a sparklfng example who can command the 
respect and leadershtp he so ricflly deserves? 
Allen E. Weseleskey,LCDR, USN 
EDITOR'S COMMENT: 
Dr. J. W. Creighton, Chainnan, Department of Business 
Administration and Economics, has advised the Editors of 
the Management Journal that he fully supports the recom-
mendations of LCDR Weselesky. Dr. Creighton acknowledges 
the needs for both a management laboratory and for a method 
of sharpening the communications skills of future NPGS 
graduates. It appears that the Management Curricula rating 
is outstanding in bringing about a significant increase in 
the infonnation bank of its students. However, one may 
question whether the school is as successful in assisting 
the students to acquire the ability to sufficiently convey 
newly gained knowledge to others. He proposes the possible 
use of a media through which an officer could develop these 
skills: an NPGS Televfsion Practice Laboratory. Through 
the utilization of such an educational tool, a student 
could develop the conmunications expertise described by 
Mr.l'Jeseleskey through a rather powerful pedagogical 
device--self-criticism. 
Implementation of this suggestion for a Television 
Practice Laboratory might well be the initial step in im-
proving the communication function that is the Hallmark of 
the educated man. 
Yit 

THE UNHEALTHY RISE OF 
HOSPITAL COSTS 
by James T. Dalton 
The author> indicates r>easons for r>ising 
costs and hospital ineffiaiency. He concludes 
on an optimistic note by spotlighting tlze 
emerging r>ole of hospital administration in 
the ar>eas of efficiency. 
James T. DALTON, LT, MSC, USN; B.A. , 1969 
from George Washington University, Washington, 
D.C.; at present, completing Management Cur-
riculum, Naval Postgraduate School. 
I. Introduction 
To merely state that the costs associated with health 
care services are rising. appears to be the understatement 
of the decade. These costs are rising astronomically. 
Between June, 1966, and June, 1968, while the general Con-
sumer Price Index was rising by an inflationary 7%, the 
medical care index maintained by the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics grew at a rate of 14%, and the index of hospital 
daily service charges rose by more than five times the gen-
eral Consumer Price Index at over 37%./1 
The cost of health care in the United States annually 
is about fifty billion dollars or approximately 6% of the 
Nation's Gross National Product./2 This is a significant 
portion of the Nation's income, and certainly justifies the 
recently felt concern by the population over these rising 
costs. 
The above statistics refer to the total health care 
field, including the costs of physicians, dentists, hospi-
tals, nurses. convalescent homes, nursing homes, etc. A 
complete analysis of the cost problems associated with the 
various components of the industry would require a Master's 
thesis vice a short paper of this type. Therefore we will 
confine our investigation to one of the major components 
of the industry - the hospital. 
/1 Einar 0. Mohn,"Consumer Challenge to Hospitals," 
Hospital Forum, XI (January. 1969), p. 8. 
/1 Ibid, p. 9. 
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There are, from the last count, 7137 hospitals within 
the United States that furnish approximately 1 and 2/3 mil-
lion hospital beds. These hospitals spend in the neighbor-
hood of $19 bi l lion to care for one out of every seven 
Americans annual ly./3 
About 80% of the hospitals are classified as community, 
non-profit, acute-care facilities, and it is these faci1i-
ties which furnish us with most of the meaningfu1 statis-
tics on hospita1 costs. It is felt that these figures are 
fairly accurate since these hospitals have nothing to hide, 
and their reimbursement (mainly from insurance companies 
and government agencies) is based on these costs. Figure 
I-1, below, is a statistical analysis of community, non-
profi t, acute-care facilities between 1963 and 1968: 
Figure I-1 Measures of Community Hospital Services/~ 
Item 1963 1968 % Increase 
Hospitals 5,684 5,820 2.4 
Beds 698,000 806,000 15.5 
Admissions 25,300 27,300 7.9 
Inpatient Days 193,600 230,700 19.2 
Total Expenses 7,532,000 14,162,000 88.0 
Let us examine each of the above statistics to deter-
mine how it has, or should have, affected hospital costs. 
First of all, it is obvious that since there were only 
136 new hospitals constructed over the five years and that 
during the same time frame 108,000 new hospital beds were 
added, many of these new beds had to be added to already 
constructed facilities. This, in itself, may be a reason 
for some of the cost increases. If you add beds to an al-
ready constructed facility, you necessarily increase the 
demand for the ancillary services which are fixed in size 
and output capacity. This in turn requires that patients 
remain in the hospital for longer periods to accomplish 
the same clinical tests that would have been required be-
fore the hospital 1 s expansion. These additional days 
naturally raise hospital costs . This theory is supported 
in another way by the above chart. Note that although ad-
missions rose over the period by 7.9%, the inpatient days 
rose during the same period by 19.2%. This indicates that 
the average hospital patient remained in the hospital 
longer in 1968 than his counterpart in 1963. 
The most dramatic stat i stic in Figure I-1 is that con-
cerning the rise in total expenses - 88 per cent . Some of 
the reasons for this rapid growth will be discussed in the 
next section of this paper. 
/3 "The Nation 1s Hospitals - A Statistical Profile," 
Hospitals {Guide Issue - Part II), Volume 43, Number 15 
(August, 1969), p. 463. 
/1_ Ibid, p. 464. 
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II. Reasons for Rising Costs 
I shall classify and discuss the reasons for the rise 
in the costs of operating hospitals into two categories: 
(1) uncontrollable; and {2) controllable. Appendix I is a 
graphic depiction of the various reasons given for the 88% 
rise in costs between 1963 and 1968. 
Uncontrollable Reasons for Rising Hospital Costs: By 
uncontrollable, I mean that these reasons cited for the 
rise in hospital costs would be expected in any other type 
of enterprise, and would be compensated for, at least par-
tially, by raising retail prices. 
The first, and certainly the most dramatic factor, that 
has caused a rise in hospital costs is in the employee wage 
area. Not only have the level of wages increased apprecia-
bly, but also the number of employees receiving those wages 
has grown significantly. Between 1963 and 1968, salaries 
rose from 4.5 billion dollars to 8.4 billion dollars (see 
Appendix I). It is estimated that 1.9 billion dollars of 
this increase was caused by higher wage levels, while the 
other 1.9 billion dollars is attributed to additional em-
ployees./5 We can continue to expect these costs to rise 
since the-wage level of hospital employees is still below 
the average wage level for most other industries. 
Two other factors that one can predict will cause 
wages to continue their upward trend, are unions and govern-
ment. The unions over the past decade have become firmly 
entrenched in the health care field, and their demands are 
beginning to be felt by management. An example of this eco-
nomic pressure was demonstrated in the strike of hospital 
nurses in the San Francisco Bay area during the spring of 
this year. The strike was ended in July and was considered 
a major victory for organized labor in the hospital field. 
The nurses received a $50 per month increase in salaries 
retroactive to 1 January 1969, and a contractual raise of 
$40 per month commencing on l January 1970. Hospital manage-
ment in the bay area has stated that these costs will be 
passed on to the consumers by increasing hospital bills by 
approximately 10% across the board./6 
The Federal Government's minimum wage law began to 
affect hospitals in February of this year. Hospitals em-
ploy many minimum-skill workers who, prior to February, 
were paid below the minimum wage rate in many geographical 
areas. When forced to raise these wages, management was 
also forced to raise all wages so that wage differentials 
could be maintained. It doesn1 t take three guesses to fig-
ure out who must pay these increased wage costs ultimately. 
ti Ibid, p. 467. 
/6 11The News at Deadline,11 Hospitals, Volume 43, Number 
14 (July, 1969), p. 38. 
3 
Another factor contributing to the rising costs of hos-
pital care for which management has no control is the demand 
for hospital services. As shown in Figure 1-1, the demand 
for hospital services has risen more rapidly than the supply 
of hospital beds, hence the longer stay per admission in 
1968. This rise in demand can partially be atrributed to 
the population increase and especially to the increase in 
the population of our senior citizens, who by virtue of 
their age require more health care than their younger coun-
terparts. But the major stress on demand for hospital ser-
vices comes from the fact that the Nation's philosophy has 
evolved from a theory of j•reed for care" to a "right to 
care 11 • People now feel, as well they should, that they have 
an absolute right to health care services and since the vast 
majority of these services are paid for by 11Uncle Sam" (Medi-
care or Medicade) or third party payers(Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield), they do not worry about costs. The demand for 
health care would be graphed almost vert i cally, and the 
average citizen, suffering from an acute condition, feels 
that there is no price level that would stop him from re-
ceiving needed and available health care./7 Seymore E. 
Harris summed up this philosophy by saying: 
Improving standards of living and the spread 
of insurance, which bring about increased use of 
hospitals, are probably the two most important 
factors accounting for the inflation of hospital 
costs./!!_ 
I agree with this statement completely. Hospital utiliza-
tion has increased tremendously. As an example, Harris 
points out that in the 1920's, 95% of the babies born in the 
United States were born in their homes, while in 1964, 95% 
of the babies born were born in hospitals./9 This could be 
called a demand-pull type of inflation of prices. The wages 
argument cited earlier could be classified in the economic 
sense as a cost-push type of inflation. Either way one 
looks at this inflation, it is obvious that these costs will 
continue to rise, and that hospital management will have 
very l i ttle control over these causes of those rises in 
costs. 
Controllable Reasons for Rising Costs. Anytime that 
ineff i ciency or low-productivity yield investment are pro-
moted or even tolerated by management, I believe that the 
/J_ Herbert E. Klarman, The Economics of Health, p. 25. 
/8 Seymour E. Harris, The Economics of American Medi-
cine,-p. 184. 
/9 Ibid, p. 169. - --
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costs associated with these ventures, which must be borne by 
the consumer, could be controlled. Although there may be 
many others, I shall devote this portion of the paper to 
identifying and discussing two of these problem areas: (1) 
the low-productivity investment; and (2) inefficiency in 
operations. 
There are many examples of the low-productivity in-
vestment; the costs of which must be borne by the patients 
confined to that hospital. Probably the best documented 
example of this is the cardiac-surgical-suite. In 1966 
a survey was taken of the hospitals on the Eastern sea-
bo rd, and it ascertained that there were 777 hospitals 
boasting of having a cardiac-surgical-suite with the physi-
cal facilities and personnel capabilities necessary to 
perfonn open or closed heart surgery. It was di~covered 
that 229 of these hospitals performed no heart surgery in 
1966, and another 477 performed only one surgical procedure 
requiring these facilities and capabilities during the en-
tire year./10 It doesn1 t take a mP.ntal oiant to detect an 
outflow of cash that could easily be controlled by manage-
ment. Other examples that come to mind are the intensive 
care wards and cardiac monitoring centers that all hospi-
tals desire as a prestige factor, but whose utilization 
rate falls far short of the rate for a regular hospital 
bed. The costs of these prestige services are paid for by 
the patient. 
The other major controllable cost factor is the inef-
ficient day-to-day operations. Many hospitals still operate 
the majority of their ancillary services on a five day a 
week basis. This means that for two days weekly one of the 
major revenue producing areas in the hospital is inactive. 
Hospital beds are inefficiently utilized in many facili-
ties. It has been estimated that an empty hospital bed 
costs the hospital 3/4 as much as a full bed with the added 
problem of producing no revenue./}l But as long as specific 
beds are indentified by sex or specific ailment, the flexi-
bility of the institution will be handicapped, and the 
costs will be forced upward. 
Traditionally, the patient 1s bill is based on the type 
of acconmodations he has utilized. The patient in a private 
room pays more than the patient in a semi-private room, who 
in turn pays more than the patient on the ward. But it may 
very well be that it is the patient on the ward who requires 
the most intense and costly treatment. Any other industry 
would attempt to match costs against revenues, or vice versa, 
in order to maximize cost effectiveness and minimize waste. 
We frequently do not discharge patients on Sundays, 
since most states require a doctor's signature upon dis-
charge. Therefore, an extra patient day is added on, and 
the costs associated therewith are passed on to the consumer. 
/10 Walter E. Landgraf, 11Needed: New Prospective on 
HealthServices," Harvard Business Review, (Sept.,1967), p.76. 
Ill. Harris, Op.cit., p. 199. 
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III. The Reasons Hospital Inefficiency is Tolerated 
Why do we as rational thinking Americans permit these 
inefficiencies to exist in hospitals? Any other industry 
would force into bankruptcy a company which oracticed any 
one of the above performances in its operations. Yet we let 
hospitals go merrily on their way, raising some complaints, 
but really not doing much about it. I believe that the 
answer to this question is partially covered by the follow-
ing four points: 
1. The hospital is a monopoly. That the hospital is 
a monopoly, at least within a given geographical area, can-
not be denied. The entry into the industry is certainly 
controlled. The tremendous capital expenditures necessary 
to build a facility, together with the licensing and con-
struction codes, enforced at both the state and local levels, 
contribute to this controlled entry into the industry. Since 
the hospital is able to act as a monopoly in setting its 
prices, the patient in seeking help does not have the oppor-
tunity to price the services demanded at various competing 
hospitals. Instead, he goes to the nearest hospital and 
checks in, never even thinking of asking the price on the 
room he is being assigned. This is something he would 
never do at a local motel or hotel. 
2. The hosaital is a non-profit enterprise. The very 
nature of the in ustry promotes inefficiency. The elimina-
tion of the incentives associated with profit maximization 
reduces the need to effect warranted changes in concepts. 
organizations and operations./12 
3. Hosfiitals utilize a unTgue method of payment. Let 
us examine w o pays the hospital bill. Klarman estimated 
in 1965, that the consumer, or more accurately his insurance, 
payed 62% of the costs; business employers as part of fringe 
benefits payed 10.5%; Government, both state and federal, 
payed 24%, and approximately 3.5% was covered by philan-
thropy./13 Since that time medicare and medicade have es-
calated government's share of hospital costs to 33 per 
cent./14 
Slnce the consumer pays an insurance premium, he feels 
entitled to more health care services which he demands and 
receives. This behavior as we pointed out earlier forces 
costs upward. These inflated costs are passed on to the 
consumer via a raise in insurance premium. Since he is now 
paying more for his insurance, he feels that he is entitled 
to still more services, and the demand-pull spiral continues. 
Jg Landgraf, Op.cit., p. 79. 
IQ Klarman, Op.cit .• p. 10. 
/14 William Freitag, "Medicare and the Hospital Revo-
l ution:"' Journal of Accountancy, Volume 127 (January, 1969), 
p. 41. 
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4. It is impossible to measure a hospital's product. 
Cost effective procedures are based on measured output. How 
does one measure the output of the health care industry in 
general or hospitals in particular? Should we base output 
on beds occupied, or average daily census, or the health of 
the population, or what? There is presently no answer to 
this question. For one to justify the rising costs, he 
would only have to say that the "quality of care" had in-
creased sufficiently to offset any rise in costs. Until a 
useful measure of productivity is formulated and adopted. 
cost effective operations will be a dream. 
IV. Management is Providing Positive Horizons 
Throughout this paper I have painted a ~retty dismal 
picture of the future of hospital costs. This is not alto- . 
gether true. Hospital administration, a relatively new sub-
speciality in the manaqement discipline, is making itself 
felt in the areas of efficiency. Several programs have been 
initiated in an attempt to slow down the rising cost spiral. 
"Efficiency" and "effectiveness" are words that are slowly 
creeping into the hospital literature, and one has only to 
look in one of the twenty or so journals devoted to hospital 
management o ascertain the level of the art. A few of the 
more promising innovations that may help to solve the rising 
cost problem are as follows: 
l. Substitute services: Administrators are constantly 
looking for methods of increasing the utilization of out-
patient and home care services, thereby eliminating costly 
inpatient days. 
2. Seven day week: By providing ancillary services 
on a seven day per week basis, hospitals hooe to reduce 
patient days and at the same time raise additional revenue. 
3. Pro~er utilization of personnel and saace: This 
will hopeful y decrease the number of empty bes, thereby 
raising revenue and spreading the fixed costs over a larger 
patient base. A recent experiment in a Minnesota hospital, 
where the patients were moved through three stages within 
the hospital during their incapacitation, has saved that 
hospital 14% of its operating costs. Stage I consisted of 
intensive type care and at any one time was occupied by 
about 20% of the hospital's census. Stage II consisted of 
normal or routine care and took care of 60% of the patient 
load. The remaining patients were considered to be conva-
lescents requiring minimum care and were placed in Stage 
III./~ 
/~ Harris, Op.cit., p. 210. 
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4. Conmunity health care planning: This concept, if 
utilized properly, will eliminate the costly low-productivity, 
prestige services described earlier. It also eliminated 
duplication of effort within the same geographical area. 
The Hill-Burton Act, which provided funds for hospital con-
struction, requires that a comnunity planning group be 
effectively operating prior to the granting of funds for 
new construction. 
5. Computers: Electronic data processing has been 
used for a number of years in the business end of the hos-
pital. One must remember that the administrative aspects 
of a hospital are very similar to those of a large hotel, 
and therefore, the business applications applicable to a 
hotel are very much applicable to a hospital. Presently 
many of the software houses are attempting to become in-
volved with the clinical side of the hospital and are re-
porting some progress. 
6. Group Purchasing and Conman Services: In many of 
the large urban areas boasting several hospitals, it has 
become mutually advantageous for them to form corporations 
or groups for conman buying in order to take advantage of 
volume discounts. Additionally they reap the benefits of 
conman-warehousing, cutting down drastically the individual 
hospital costs for personnel in these areas. One group of 
hospitals in Chicago has estimated that in 1966 they saved 
$60,000 doing group purchasing./1.§. Several of these groups 
are now in the planning stages of constructing such joint 
services as collfflon laundries and food preparation opera-
tions, with hopes of realizing cost savings via the econo-
mies of sea 1 e. 
These are just a few examples of the forward type 
thinking within the industry. It is foreseeable that the 
costs of hospitalization will continue to rise, but it is 
also thought that the days of the violently escalating pri-
ces have passed. 
/16 P. Michael O'Sullivan, 11Hospitals Try to Cure a 
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PROJECT MANAGEMENT: A S UDY IN GETTING 
THINGS DONE 
by P. C. NeZson 
& W. A. Ruok er 
This paper has as its purpose an over-
Vie?J of a reZativeZy new way of gett ing aom-
pZe:x: things done. Project Ma.nagement is the 
term coined to describe the diaaonaZ cross-
ing of organizational. Zines. · 
P. C. NELSON, LCDR, USN; B.S., Univer-
sity of Colorado, 1959; M.S. in Management 
with distinction, NPGS, 1968; presently on 
duty as Executive Officer of the USS Knox. 
W. A. RUCKER, LCDR, USN; B.A., Uni-
versity of Nebraska, 1957; M.S. in Manage-
ment, NPGS, 1968; presently on duty in 
Washington, D.C., in the office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations. 
Very large organizations, with their usual pyramidal 
structures for the routine handling of mundane tasks, are 
notably unsuccessful in the efficient accomplishment of a 
highly complex task. Parkinson has elucidated this very 
aptly with regard to bureaucracy, but it is broader than 
that--it applies to the military and to industry as well. 
In the military sector, among the most renown of the indi-
viduals who have been able to accomplish a highly complex 
task is Admiral Rickover. His penchant for cutting across 
organizational lines is widely known, as is his willingness 
for stepping on toes as necessary to get the task accom-
plished. It is the formalization of this diagonal cross-
ing of organizational lines that lies at the essence of 
project management. 
If the development of the nuclear-powered submarine 
and its subsequent mating with the Polaris missile come 
to mind as examples where our institutions have succeeded, 
it is useful and instructive to remember some instances 
where they have failed. 
The 4ttempted development of the Drone Anti-submarine 
Helicopter in the 19501 s is such an example. The project 
to develop this concept (DASH) was attempted through 
11normal11 organization . It floundered and floundered until. 
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in exasperation, the Chief of Naval Operations demanded to 
see the individual in charge of the DASH Project. As it - . - 0 turned out, there was no one in charge ... reseonstbi 'li'ty r, ~t)~~l 
could 6e narrowed down to a group of oureau chiefs, but not 
to some single indtvtdual. 
Another example of this was the Surface-to-Air Ship 
Missile System that never really 11got off tfte ground11 until 
one man was placed in charge and given authority to match 
this huge responsibility. 
This paper has as fts purpose an overview of thi's rela-
tively new way of getting complex things done. The general 
concepts and guidelines will first be discussed, then it 
will be shown how these procedures compare to what is being 
practiced in industry and government. 
Project Management Concepts 
The experiences of World War II, stimulated by the 
increasing complexities and costs of development of weapons, 
coupled with the arrival of the notion that a weapon is not 
just a weapon but a 11system", taught lessons and produced 
improved approaches to management within the DOD, one of 
which was the concept of "Project Management". Project 
Management is the application of exceptional, centralized 
and integrated management by a team of technical and busi-
ness management experts, having the resources at their dis-
posal to get a job done. It has in mind the accomplishment 
of a single, specific objective or the accomplishment of 
closely related objectives, and the subsequent disestablish-
ment of the project organization. Its princinal ingredients 
of success are managerial and technical skill, resources to 
do the job, the full cooperation of all concerned, and 
control. It is a 11team11 effort with all participants pull-
ing together with a sense of urgency permeating the entire 
effort. It is a game of "trade-offs" and competition be-
tween hardware "systems 11 • In short, Project Management 
is--or should be--a limited application of a sound manage-
ment discipline applied to urgent, costly and complex 
effort. Specifically, the concept includes the notions of : 
A. Centralized, Exceptional Executive Authority and Control 
It is a departure--conceptually and traditionally--to 
vest centralized, executive authority in a single individual 
who is in undisputed control over the total effort associated 
with the life cycle of a system's development, production, 
test, installation, check out, and support, etc. Yet this 
is one of the major concepts of Project Management. It 
equates to the management of the "Manhattan Project 11 and 
other notable examples of centralized management. It 
means that one individual has the authority to move across 
conventional, functional lines to get a job done. This is 
not in a 11coordination 11 capacity. It is in an executive 
capacity. Usually someone in this capacity carries with 
him--in military terms--the authority of a 11Commander11 or 
a "Department Head", or a "Chief11• 
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B. Government--Industry "Team" Effort 
Although the Project Management Office is the 11systems11 
manager under the Project Management concer,t, the concept 
is hopefully extended to include industry 'Project Manage-
ment" teams with a counterpart Project Manager whose authori-
ties equate to the Government's Project Manager. As in the 
case of the government PM, the industrial PM hopefully will 
have the autnority to cross functional lines of the plant 
to get the job done. By this procedure it is hoped that 
increased attention will be paid to the project in the plant, 
quicker reaction time to problems acquired, channels of 
co111T1unication shortened, authority centralized, decision-
making hastened, and a superior motivation developed--the 
same reasons that exist for establishing Project Management 
in the Government. In the implementation of this concept, 
it is irrmediately recognized that there is a marked dif-
ference among industrial firms as to its acceptability. 
some industrial firms may wholeheartedly implement the con-
cept on a voluntary basis, some might require it to be "put 
in the contract", some may voluntarily implement it on a 
modified basis. 
C. Product or Deliverable End Item Management 
Traditionally, both Government and industry are organi-
ized along functional lines; e.g., development, production, 
sales, finance, support, etc. Therefore, this is the way 
that management raditionally acts and thinks. The emphasis 
is on skills, people, organizations and money. In Project 
Management people and skills are not forgotten, but they 
are thought of in terms of their contribution to a thing, 
a product, a deliverable end item. For example, in contem-
plating the budget, the "system" and all of its components 
are contemplated simultaneously and on an integrated basis . 
Product oriented work breakdown structures are developed 
to serve as the structure around which management planning 
is structured. 
D. Integrated Management 
This means that the "thing," the product, the system, 
the item that one is managing is managed as an integrated 
whole and not in isolated parts. The first steps of man-
agement, however primitive, look through the glass to the 
end product operating at some place, by someone, in certain 
quantities and requiring certain support. Constraints and 
interfaces are carefully assessed from the beginning in 
terms of "systems" impact. Systems engineering, integrated 
logistics, and integrated financial control under this 
concept become bywords of management. 
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E. Other Basi.c Considerations 
functional support. Though the concept of Project 
Management places across-the-board authori'ty and control into 
tne nands of tne Project Manager, it does not place across-
the-board manpower esources into tfle hands of the Project 
Manager. In other words, the concept is that the Project 
Manager wtll have a limited staff and will be supported 6y 
responsive functional speci'alists wflo remai'n in their own 
corps organizations. 
Functional partty. In order that the Project Manager 
and his staff may be a61e to effectively cut across all 
functional lines, the concept is that the Project Manager 
and his staff will have the rank/grade, experience and 
qualifications to accomplish this without Built-in constraints. 
Resource Control. A most important concept is that 
the Project Manager have control over all resources allo-
cated to his project; most importantly, funds. 
Well-Publicized Pro ect and Or anization. Unless con-
straine y security, 1t is expecte tat t e existence of 
a project will be well-publicized in the scientific, indus-
trial and educational community. It is expected that the 
total 0 team", both Government and industry, will f>e identi-
fiable by placing names in telephone directories, planning 
documents, and other appropriate documents. It is also ex-
pected that new~ stories will be printed and other PIO 
activities accomplished. 
Limited Application. It is not intended that Project 
Management concepts and disciplines be aoplied to other 
than the highest priority projects, most complex projects 
and most costly projects. 
Disestablishment. Once the primary objectives of a 
project have been accomplished, the concept is that any 
vest ige effort be folded back into 11Normal11 management; 
e.g . , back into conventional> functional organizations. 
Nonnally, this will be accomplished by a "Transition Plan. 11 
/! 
F. Discussion of the Concepts of Project Management 
The form of a bureaucracy is almost universally hier-
archial, whereas the management of project activities re-
quires horizontal and diagonal relationships. In such an 
organization, managers and technicians deal horizontally 
with peers and associates at different levels in the same 
organization and with outside organizations. To follow 
the 11chain of conmand" would be unwieldly, time consuming, 
and costly and would disrupt and delay the work. Horizontal 
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and vertical contacts grOW' out of the necessity to get the 
job done; they are seldom charted, and yet the~ a~e neces-
sary to a smooth flow of work in tne organization. Th.ese 
relationships have been called the 11informal organtzaton.;'' 
but tnis is a m,:snomer. There may be little informaliity; 
tne standards of performance may be just as strtngent as 
those in the formal structure. In many cases, these rela-
tionships have sufficient strength and permanency to oe-
come de facto the modus operandi of the organizatf.~n. 
The acceptance of horizontal-vertical relaUonshi -ps 
between members of an organi"zati'on re qui res ch.anges i'TI the 
organtzational form. The realignment of tasks, the re-
structuring of the formal hierarchical structure, and the 
de jure recognition of a hybrid organizational form have 
been accompHshed in many of today's corporations. In 
weapons-system management, rigid hierarchical structuring 
has been abandoned in favor of closely integrated project 
groups. An informal structure to manage the "stream of 
projects" has its pitfalls, however, since the administra-
tion of a project raises unique problems that preclude 
normal coordination, corrmunication and control. As a 
project grows, the system of working through informal con-
tacts becomes inadequate to cope with the sevedty and 
frequency of management relationships. Large projects re-
quire close coordination, since seemingly insignificant 
errors can boomerang into large costs and scfiedule slippages. 
Project organization must reflect how all things fit to-
gether, but this fitting together must not become a sacred 
organizational chart, with its job descriptions and task 
divisions, that turns into a fence rather than serving as 
a ~uide for accomplishing theJi)b."' Too often the manager 
th n s of his organization as an independent entity, com-
pletely self-sufficient in its environment. The manager 
of large projects must have a new approach to his job: 
His way of thinking must permit him to utilize 
new knowledge in management literature which 
recognizes that a strictly vertical approach 
to management is not necessary. 
He must become reoriented away from the purely 
functional approach to the management of human 
and nonhuman resources. 
He must be able to visualize this role beyond 
his company's (or unit's) internal operations 
and to understand how the project relates to 
its envir~nment and to other projects in it. 
He must understand that purposeful conflict 
may very well be a necessary way of life as 
he manages his project across many vertical 
organizational lines. 
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.•• He must recognize that project management is 
a dynamic activity where major changes are 
almost the order of the day./_g_ 
G. Comparison of Project Management and Traditional 
Management 
One must first understand the framework of the project 
environment and the phenomena found in it if he is to 
really understand the concept. This framework points up 
the salient differences between the role of the Project 
Manager and that of the traditional functional manager. 
While these differences are possibly more theoretical than 
actual, differences do exist, and they affect the manager's 
modus operandi and his philosophy. The differences in the 
viewpoints of the pro~ect and functional managers are out-
lined in the table wh ch follows. This comparison high-
lights a singular characteristic of the project manager; 
i.e., he must manage activities that include extensive 
participation by organizations and people not under his 
direct (line) control. 
PHENOMENA 
Line-staff 








Vestiges of the hierar-
chical model remain, 
but line functions are 
placed in a support 
position. 
Elements of the verti-
cal chain exist, but 
prime emphasis is 
placed on horizontal 
and diagonal work flow. 
Important business is 





relationships are used 
to conduct much of the 
salient business. 
FUNCTIONAL VIEWPOINT 
Line function have 
direct responsibility 
for accomplishing the 
objectives; line com-
mands, and staff ad-
vises. 
The chain of authority 
relationships is from 
superior to subordi-
nate throughout the 
organization. Central 
and important business 
is conducted up and 
down the vertical 
hierarchv. 
This is the most im-
portant relationship. 
If kept healthy, suc-
cess will follow. All 
important business is 
conducted through a 
pyramiding structure 
of superiors and sub-
ordinates. 
/,£ David I. Cleland and William R. King, Systems 
Analysis and Pro~ect Mana1ement (New York: McGraw-Hill BookCompany, 19 8)~ pp. 52-153. 
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PHENOMENA PROJECT VIEWPOINT FUNCTIONAL VIEWPOINT 
Organizational Management of a project Organizational objec-
objectives becomes a joint venture tives are sought by the 
of many relatively in- parent unit (an assem-
dependent organizations bly of suborganiza-
--thus, the objective tions) working within 
becomes multilateral. its environment. The 
objective is unilateral. 
Unity of The project manager The general manager 
direction manages across func- acts as the one head 
tional and organiza- for a group of activi-
tional lines to accom- ties having the same 
plish a common interor- plan. 
qanizational obiective. 
Parity of Considerable opportuni- Consistent with func-
authority and ty exists for the proj- tional management; the 
res pons ibi 1 i ty ect manager's responsi- integrity of the supe-
bility to exceed his rior-subordinate rela-
authority. Support tionship is maintained 
people are often re- through functional au-
sponsible to other man- thority and advisory 
agers (functional) for staff services. 
pay, performance re-
ports, oromotions, etc. 
Time The project (and hence Tends to perpetuate 
duration the organization) is itself to provide con-
finite in duration. tinuing facilitative 
support./3 
Project Managers in the Hierarchy 
Although industry uses the words "program" and "proj-
ect" as synonyms, one must take care when referring to the 
with regard to the DOD. This section will seek to eluci-
date the "pl ace II of the PM in the Navy. 
Relationship of the Project Manager with the Program 
Coordinator 
Detailed description of the Planning, Progra11111ing 
and Budgeting System (PPBS) is not within the scope of 
this paper. Briefly, the term "programning system" is 
defined as the total process of developing, submitting, 
and implementing approved programs. It involves the 
analytical studies, planning, determination of objectives, 
program development, budget analysis and, upon implemen-
tation, the control of resource inputs to achieve a de-
sired military output. 
/l Ibid., p. 246. 
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Selected programs within OPNAV are given management 
supervision by the appropriate Program Sponsor through the 
designation of a Program Coordinator (PC). The PC is 
chartered to function as the representative, through the 
appropriate Deputy, of the CNO, and has the responsibility 
to see that the program is complete and fulfills the re-
quirements expressed and approved by the CNO. The desig-
nation of the PC is similar in concept to the designation 
of a Project Manager within the Naval Material Corrmand. 
The technical aspects of a program are 11run11 by the Project 
Manager with such guidance as the Program Coordinator may 
provide. 
Program Coordinators are assigned by Program Sponsors 
and approved by the VCNO. The PC functions as the direct 
representative of the Program Sponsor and, with the assis-
tance of the Program Coordination Group, is responsible for 
the development of a complete and fully-integrated program 
centering on the production of a material item or system 
which is the direct responsibility of the Project Manager. 
Generally, then, a Project Manager will report to a Program 
Coordinator./4 
If one thinks, with regard to a particular project, 
of a "Project Team" consisting of Project Manager, Program 
Coordinator and Program Sponsor ..•. then a typical de-
piction of the overall concept with regard to the Navy is 
shown in exhibit one./~ This does not show all possible 
cases. 
Levels of Project Management Designation 
The Secretary of the Navy has delegated to the CNO 
and the Conmandant of the Marine Corps the authority to: 
l. Select and establish Designated Projects which 
meet the proper criteria (to be discussed subsequently}, 
2. Select and appoint individuals as Designated 
Project Managers, 
3. Designate the official to whom a 11Designated11 
PM will report, and, 
4. Prepare and Issue the Project Charters. 
Projects will normally be established at the Systems 
Command level except in special cases which involve un-
usual interfaces or conditions. When it is determined 
/! Navy Project Manager•s Management Manual, pp. 11-12. 
/§_ United States Navy, Naval Material Conmand, ~ro~-
ect Management in the Navy (MAT 0111}, (Washington: ea -
quarters Naval Material Command, 1968), p. 14. 
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exhibit one 
that critical interfaces exist with other military services, 
other governmental agencies, or between Systems Commands, 
or that there are major technical complexities or other 
special circumstances, the project will be designated by, 
and the Project Manager will report to, the Chief of Naval 
Material. Also, when it is determined that the proposed 
project is, for the most part, under the cognizance of a 
Systems Command, the project will be designated 5y, and the 
PM will report to, the Systems Commander. Also, when it is 
determined that the Navy is to be the Executive Agent in 
a Joint-Service Project, the CNM will prepare, negotiate 
and issue for the Secretary of the Navy a jointly-approved 
Charter and shall appoint a Project Manager, who shall re-
port to the CNM. Finally, when it is determined that a 
Service, other than the Navy, will be the Executive Agent, 
the Chief of Naval Material will appoint a representative 
to participate in the Charter preparation, Project Office 
staffing and Project Master Plan negotiations./~ 
Criteria For Establishment of 11Project Managementu 
In view of the very rigid interpretations within DOD 
of Project Management, it is necessary to have some feel 
for how important a project must be in order to warrant 
11exceptional 11 treatment. 
Mandatory Criteria 
All those new (or major modifications of existing 
production systems) or new Engineering and Operational 
Systems Developments having one or more of the following 
characteristics are to be designated for project manage-
ment: 
1. Those which have a special priority category 
called 118RICKBAT11 (Defined in DOD Directive 5010.14). 
2. Those which are estimated to require total cumu-
lative ROT & E financing in excess of $25M or are esti-
mated to require a total production investment in excess 
of $100M. 
Optional Criteria 
Other systems/projects may be designated for project 
management when they possess one or more of the following 
characteristics: 
1. Have a significant effect on United States mili-
tary posture. 
/§_ Navy Project Manager' s Management Manual, 
pp. 13-14. 
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2. Are closely related and, when taken collectively, 
would qualify under the $25M and $100M threshholds above. 
3. Are conducted on a substantially concurrent basis, 
particularly when significant technical problems are anti-
pated. 
4. Involve unusual orgnizational complexity or tech-
nological advancement. 
5. Require extensive interdepartmental, nation or 
international coordination or support. 
6. Present unusual difficulties which need expedi-
tious handling to satisfy an urgent requirement. 
Included in the policy on optional application is the 
DOD policy requiring caution and discretion in the use of 
"options" since project management causes a drain on 
supporting resources. 
When to Establish the Initial Project Management Office 
DOD directives provide that 11A System/Project Manage-
ment Office shall be established and staffed with the 
minimum necessary cadre of personnel as early as practi-
cable, preferably prior to submission of the Master Plan 
and the initial Program Change Request for the project.n 
The Naval Material Corm,and provides that 11A pro-
visional Project Management Office will be established as 
early as practicable, preferably early enough to prepare 
the request for the approval of Concept Formulation and 
for all projects designated under mandatory criteria, in 
time to prepare the requests for proposals for Contract 
Definition phase Contractor Selections." 
In practice the initial establishment of a fonnal 
Project Management organization in the Naval Material Com-
mand will most likely occur: 
1. Shortly after the receipt in the NMC of one of 
the following documents: an Advance Development Objective 
(ADO), or a Specific Operational Requirement (SOR); and, 
when it is determined by the Principal Development Activity 
{PDA) that the mandatory provisions apply. 
2. At any time within the life cycle of an effort 
when the Chief of Naval Material is directed to implement 
the discipline of Project Management by DOD, SECNAV, or
CNO. 
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3. At any time within the life cycle of a project 
when the CNM or the Corrmander of one of the Naval Material 
Systems Cormnands etermines that the optional criteria 
should be fnvoked./7 
Policy of Functional Parity 
Experience has indicated that the establishment and 
maintenance of adequate and effective functional support 
by participating organizations is one of the most difficult, 
bothersome and time-consuming tasks that a Project Manager 
faces. There is little evidence to date that the designa-
tion of effort for 11Project Management" sparks any spon-
taneous, enthusiastic, exceptional effort on the part of 
supporting functional organfzations--notwithstandfng the 
DOD policy that effort in support of a PM "shall be con-
sidered a principal responsibility. 11 The PM faces the 
task of overcoming competing priorities, entrenched au-
thori'ty and responsi oil ity, established allegiances to 
persons and organizations, the lack of appreciation of 
the PM's role, status and objectives, and the desire for 
"Business as usual. 11 Experience has also shown, however, 
that certain procedures can be instituted to partially 
overcome the constraints to effective functional support, 
i.e., the permitting of infonnal arrangements that come 
in through the "back door11 under a "cumshaw" arrangement--
but that the key to success will ultimately rest upon 
forthright, frank and straightforward approaches to the 
problems which arise./8 
DOD anticipated the problems of 11support11 and for 
this reason promulgated the policy of 11functional parity", 
i.e., the Project Management organization shall be com-
posed of sufficient grade stuucture, size, and quality of 
personnel to deal effectively with staff, field and 
functional personnel who must support the project. 
The Project Charter 
The Project Charter is "The document approved and 
issued by appropriate authority that establishes a Project 
Manager and his management office; defines his mission, 
authority and major functions; and describes his relation-
ships with other organizations and their support responsi-
bilities. "/2. 
II Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
/'§_ Ibid., p. 26. 
/9 United States Department of Defense, DOD Directive 
5010.14, (Washington: Department of Defense, 1968). 
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This formal document is the license enabling the PM 
to cut across functional lines. The providing of a mfssion 
statement is accompanied by a statement which delineates 
the scope of the project. Five-Year Defense Program ele-
ments (or parts thereof) identified predominantly with the 
project and for which the PM has responsibili~y are speci-
fied to the extent that they are known. 
A. Content of the Charter 
It is the responsibility of the Project Manager to 
prepare and coordinate his own charter, but this does not 
mean that he is given a blank check. Systems Cormnand 
designated charters are prepared within the Command and 
with its approval. CNM designated charters are preoared 
within CNM. All charters require the approval of the 
Chief of Naval Material. After this approval, charters 
of the Systems Conmand will be extended to include a 
statement of approval by CNM. Thus, regardless of who 
originates the document, there is a central approving au-
thority who must, within the Navy, screen them all. In 
order to facilitate this, the Chief of Naval Material has 
set forth the following standard charter content:/.1.Q. 
PM. 
l. The scope of authority and responsibility of the 
2. Provisions for an initial comprehensive review 
and appraisal of the disciplines, techniques, procedures 
and processes employed in the Project Management Office. 
3. The scope and mission of the project. 
4. Identification of all supporting organizations 
and their role {including field activities). 
5. The initial cadre of personnel to assist the 
Project Manager in starting the project. 
6. Staff augmentation and buildup. 
7. Description of the system/component/item managed. 
8. Background of events leading up to the establish-
ment of the Charter. 
9. Actions necessary to be taken to activate the 
particular project. 
10. The submission of staffing patterns. 
/10 United States Navy, Naval Material Command, 
NAVMATINST 5000.SA (Washington: Headquarter Naval Material 
Co1m1and, 1968). 
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11. Responsibility for dissemination of public infor-
mation. 
12. Provisions for proj ect disestablishment. 
B. Project Numbering 
Each newly-designated project is assigned an identi-
fication code. Codes are assigned and controlled by the 
Chief of Naval Material (MAT 011}. Systems Command organi-
zational codes are not assigned to CNM-desiqnated projects 
or vice versa. This i s necesary to prevent the double-
coding of projects . 
Procedures for codi ng Project Management Offices 
are as follows: Ill 
11The Chief of Naval Material (MAT Oll) will assign 
codes to both CNM-designated projects and to Systems Com-
mand-designated projects. Insofar as possible, the follow-
ing blocks of numbers will be reserved: 
CNM-des i gnated • . . . . . . . 
Air Systems Command-designated . 
Ships Systems Command • ••. 
Ordnance Systems Command .. . 
Electronic Systems Command • • 
l through 30 
. 31 through 75 
76 through 95 
. . 96 through 115 
• . 116 through 130 
The numbers are preceded by 11PM11 for CNM projects, 
"PMA" for Naval Air Systems Command, "PMS" for Naval Ship 
Systems Command, "PM011 for Naval Ordnance Systems Command, 
11PME11 for Naval Electronic Systems Command, 11PML11 for Naval 
Supply Systems Command, and "PMF11 for Naval Facilities 
Systems Command. 
Specific Responsibilities of the Project Manager 
Basically, the PM exercises authority over the plan-
ning, direction and control of the approved project; 
exercises financial management over utilizat i on of all re-
sources approved by the Five-Year Defense Program and 
Budget--and assigned to him by the Chief of Naval Material. 
Specifically, the following guidance and policy is 
provided for Project Management: /R 
1. Plan, organize , and administer the PM office. 
/11 United States Navy, Naval Material Command, 
NAVMATNOTE 5000 of 3 February 1967 (Washington: Headquar-
ters Naval Material Command, 1968). 
/12 United States Navy, Naval Material Command, 
NAVMATTifST 5000.. SA (Washington: Headquarters Naval Material 
Conmand, 1968). 
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2. Make business and technical management decisions 
as authorized by the charter . 
3. Establish detailed initial and long-range plan-
ning, and objectives. 
4. Manage accomplishment of experimental test, engi-
neering, and analytic studies. 
5. Approve estimates of funding requirement prior to 
incorporation into the FYDP or budget. 
6. Manage contract definition in accordance with 
SECNAVINST 3900.33 (Initiation of Engineering and Opera-
tional Systems Development). 
7. Preparation and submission of Technical Develop-
ment Plans (TDP's) in accordance with OPNAVINST 3910.4B 
using NAVMATINST P3910 as a guide. 
8. Preparation and submission of Program Change 
Requests (PCR's) in accordance with SECNAV Operational 
Procedure number 2. 
9. Preparation and maintenance of the Project Master 
Plan. 
10. Exercise financial management control over all 
funds. 
11. Define work efforts to be undertaken by inhouse 
and contractor activities ••. and approve final plan to 
accomplish the effort. 
12. Furnish information and requirements as necessary 
for effective procurement planning and control negotiations . 
13. Establish and promulgate design interface speci-
fications to ensure system integration with other project 
managers and COlmlanders of various Systems Commands. 
14. Coordinate interface problems with other Project 
Managers and functional activities . 
15. Negotiate, for CNM approval, working agreements 
outside the Naval Material Corrmand. 
16. Establish and promulgate criteria for tests and 
demonstrations, evaluation and installation of systems, 
subsystems, components, equipments and devices. 
17. Insure above in #16 are developed and procured 
in time for concurrent delivery with major components. 
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18. Comply with the provisions for 11Advanced Procure-
ment Planning" (SECNAVINST 4200.188). 
19. Establish methods and procedures to implement 
configuration control, including mechanized configuration 
files (punched card or tape) for each major system. 
20. Ensure development, implementati-on and maintenance 
of the Integrated Logistics System (ILS} Plan for the 
proj~ct in accordance with current directives. 
21. Ensure that quality assurance, reliability, main-
tainability, and value engineering programs are adequate. 
22. Ensure that all technical documentation is pre-
pared and is available for training, operation, mainte-
nance and overhaul personnel. 
23. Direct procurement of required trainers and 
training devices. Ensure training plans are developed for 
instructors, operating, maintenance and overhaul personnel . 
24. Ensure that the procedures in the Maintenance and 
Material Manual (OP 43P2) are used to provide feedback in-
formation on material usage associated with maintenance 
actions and for analysis of system performance relative to 
performance specifications. 
25. Maintain complete chronological history of the 
project including significant events and decisions. 
26. Establish management control techniques and pro-
cedures to provide accurate, timely and comprehensive in-
formation on the status and progress of the project. 
27. Furnish data to Systems Commands by preparing 
consolidated reports on selected categories of hardware. 
28. Report current status and progress to appropriate 
departmental officials. 
29. Prepare fitness reports and efficienty ratings of 
military and civilian personnel assigned. 
30. Ensure security clearances for project personnel. 
31. Ensure necessary security safeguards. 
32. Ensure that the material aspects of personnel 
training are adequate. 
33. Establish and promulgate criteria for specialized 
shore facilities required for operations and support. 
34. Comply with the provisions of the Navy Cost 
Reduction Program. 
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Restrictions on Project Manager Authority 
The authority of the Project Manager shall not include: 
/Jl 
1. Deviations from Navy policy and procedures. 
2. Final approval on Advance Procurement Plans. 
3. Final approval on Technical Development Plans, 
on the Project Master Plan and changes thereto. 
4. Changes to schedules established by higher au-
thority for delivery and operational use. 
5. Changes degrading mission performance or altering 
operational characteristics specified by higher authority. 
6. Authority to act as contracting officer in the 
execution of contracts or changes thereto. 
Epilogue 
Subsequent to the writing of all previous material in 
this paper, the seminar took field trips to three major 
installations, each of which were vitally concerned with 
project management. The first, which we shall denote 
simply as 11A11 , was a major branch of a large corporation 
contracting with the U.S. Government in the research, 
development, and production of military intercontinental 
ballistic missiles and associated space technology. The 
second was a military installation charged with the re-
sponsibility, in broad terms, 11to provide engineering and 
logistical support in matters relative to research, de-
velopment, test and evaluation, procurement, production, 
quality control, training, and service-use aspects of all 
elements of Navy ship guided surface missile weapons 
systems.11 We have designated this installation 11B11• The 
last was a government-owned research and development center 
operated by a civilian institution under contract to the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and 
has been designated 11C11• 
Well in advance of each visit, the installation was 
sent a detailed letter explaining the work of the seminar 
and the particular aspects of their operation which we 
desired to discuss with them. The result was that top 
management became involved in all instances and had readied 
presentations to explain their operation to us at our level 
and had prepared panels of experts to "field 11 our questions. 
Ill Ibid. 
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For the authors and many others in the seminar, this 
provided a capstone to a year of intensive postgraduate-
level study in the field of management. It was obvious, 
in the course of the discussions, that not only were the 
student members of the seminar impressed with the function -
ing managers; they were impressed with the students and 
the caliber of their questions and insights into problems 
expressed by management. The experience was thoroughly re-
warding. 
Recreating all that transpired is beyond the scope 
of this paper. An attempt will be made, however, to high-
light some of the major 11lessons learned11 • 
A. Funds Control 
All three were deeply involved in this aspect to such 
a degree that its influence cascaded down throughout the 
entire organization of each. There were different facets 
of this predominant. For although each derived its funds 
ultimately through contract or appropriation to the U.S. 
Government, the funding process was more critical to 11A11--
the private enterprise--apparently because they were re-
quired to expend their own funds on a multi-year basis, 
whereby their projects were funded by the Congress on a 
yearly basis. These serious fiscal year funding problems 
were exacerbated by what was described by a project manager 
as the different "colors of money11• Specifically, his 
funds were appropriated in five categories: 






- Production, Aircraft, Missiles, Navy 
- Ship Conversion, Navy 
- Other Procurement, Navy 
- Operations and Maintenance, Navy 
The fact that these funds are appropriated yearly, 
and that there was no shuffling allowed among the categories, 
caused such serious problems in schedules and planning that 
the project manager spent an estimated fifty to seventy-
five percent of his time on 11other than technical prob-
lems11--especially funding. One possible reason for this 
vociferousness on the part of the PM concerning funding 
is that 11A11 was experiencing a general cutback in their 
operation and loss of governmental priorities they had 
once--but no longer--enjoyed. 
B. Response of the Functional Organization to the PM 
In all three organizationss the concept of project 
management was a way of life. It was accepted that it was 
necessary for the PM to cut across functional lines. Ex-
pressed either explicitly or otherwise in all was a deep 
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sense of trust in their dealings with each other and with 
their various interfaces in government and industry. In 
A's case for example, contracts were in some instances 
vaguely written to provide flexibility that resulted in a 
better or less costly product than would othen1ise have 
been obtained through more literal contract definition. 
The circumstance of B was such that their program was 
generally expanding, so that the demands of the PM's were 
met by obtaining additional resources. In C's situation, 
however, there were strict constraints of money, personnel 
and time. Further, their work was such that although they 
were operating on the very frontiers of science, they were 
under contract to provide their output on time within a 
certain price. 
In all cases when an organization must perform routine 
functions and concurrently be responsive to the more or 
less unpredictable demands of the PM, either a cushion of 
slack resources must be built into the functional organi-
zation, or it must have the ability to expand rapidly--
either by direct expansion, or by contractual arrangements 
with other organizations. 
C. Project Foldback 
Disestablishment of a project--especially when the PM 
has 11barked lots of shins" in the process of accomplishing 
his objective--poses a chance for real personal crises to 
the PM. Returning to Admiral Rickover as an example, he 
likely would have been forced to leave the military had it 
not been for special consideration given him by the Congress. 
It may well be that the trail blazed by previous PM's who 
have performed so very well has caused a reordering of 
thinking along these lines. In any event, this facet of 
project management was of little concern to the three or-
ganizations visited. 
In those installations visited, only Chad experienced 
foldback of the project organization into the functional. 
It caused little difficulty and the PM involved was soon 
to be given a new project. 
D. Elements of Project Management Success 
The most important single element is the project 
manager himself. This is begging the question ... rather 
like saying that an effective team must have an effective 
leader. Still, historically, successful projects have 
been those which have enjoyed managers with the 11moxie11 
to get the job done. Identification of this quality is 
no less difficult than that of leadership in general. But 
having a good project manager does not assure project 
success •.. nothing can. Still, there are other finite 
elements that contribute greatly. 
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Foremost of these is a clear understanding and defini-
.tion of the project 1 s objectives. This given, there must 
be a high degree of fle.xibility generally, while speciff-
cally--in the area of planning--one factor which stands out 
as a basic difference in a project organization•s ability 
to succeed where a functional organization has tradition-
ally failed is that of ability and amenity to change. As 
one PM planner put it, "hang loose! 11 Taken from that ver-
1nacular is an important point: the project manager plan-
ning system must be such that both setbacks and windfalls 
can, with facility, be taken into inmediate consideration, 
the entire plan being revised daily if necessary. This is 
diametrically opposed to the bureaucratically-lethargic 
response of "it 1s just our policy" to change. 
Mentioned previously is the fact that the PM must have 
·· the requisite procedures, policies, personnel and equip-
ment and the control over them. 
Finally, there must be sufficient slack time to ob-
viate destructive pressures that operating in an environ-
ment of urgency can have upon the psyche of the individuals 
involved. Where this is not possible, careful considera-
tion must be given to the observation of the individual 
for pressure symptoms so that he--an especially valuable 
resource--has these pressures relieved in time to prevent 
his destruction. Systems that leave this observation to 
happenstance and self-observation should remember that 
humans are perfectly capable of working themselves to 
death. 
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A TREND FOR CORRECTIONS 
by John E. Buckley 
In this paper~ the author proposes that 
the trend in American penology should be to 
connect the offender with the opportunity 
systems of the corrmunity and to integrate 
him with the socialising institutions of 
society. 
John E. BUCKLEY, LCDR, SC, USN; B.S., 
United States Naval Academy, 1956; M.S. in 
Management, NPGS, 1969; presently on duty 
in Norfolk, Virginia, as the Assistant to 
the Fleet Supply Officer, CINCLANTFLT. 
"The mood and temper of the public with 
regard to the treatment of crime and 
criminals is one of the most unfailing 
tests of the civilization of any country." 
Sir Winston Churchil l 
Introduction 
In every organized society in the world, the problem 
of illegal or harmful acts perpetrated by one man upon 
others has presented a control problem. Every type of 
punishment, from banishment to death, from incarceration 
to maiming, has been tried . The current rising incidence 
of crime seems related to factors other than the deterrant 
power of punishment, no matter how severe or cruel.fl How-
ever, retaliation and revenge against a wrongdoer nas a 
morality older than recorded history. When malefactors 
are made to expiate, society goes on a moral orgy, tne re-
covery from which restores social equiliorium./2 
/! Progress Report of the Assembly Cornnittee on 
Criminal Procedure; Deterrent Effects of Criminal Sanctions; 
Assembly of the State of California; May 1968; p. 10. 
If Reckless, W. C; The Crime Problem; Appleton-Century-
Crofts, Inc. ; New York, New York; l96l; p. 58~. 
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The progress of civilization can almost be traced by 
its treatment of and attitude toward deviants. A man is 
believed to be accountable for his acts and a penalty is 
tfie sanction that supports eccounta5ility. Thus, we convict, 
institutionalize and attempt to reconstruct a person at tne 
same time -- a system which has yielded disappointing re-
sults. Historically, our response to this challenge has 
reflected the unwillingness of the public and its leaders 
to face the facts and admit that the system, at a cost of 
some five billion dollars a year, fails to operate as ad-
vertised./3 
The 340-page report by the President's Commission on 
Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice opens 
with, 11There is much crime in America, more than ever is 
reported, far more than ever is solved, far too much for 
the health of the Nation. Every American knows that. 11/4 
Unfortunately, the paradox of the last sentence is part-of 
the problem - the general public knows very little aoout 
the current trends in penology, crime, penalties, recidivism, 
system costs to the taxpayer and the like. As a matter of 
fact, a recent study conducted in California shows that the 
general public is the least knowledgeable group in these 
areas and, as might be expected, inmates of adult correctional 
institutions were the most knowled~eable./5 The most 
striking fact regarding the correctional system today is 
that, although presumably the rehabilitation of criminals 
is its major purpose, the custody of criminals is its 
major effort! There are over a million people being "cor-
rected" in this country today. Approximately one-third of 
this number are in jails or prisons; however, this area 
accounts for four-fifths of the correctional funds spent 
and nine-tenths of the employees engaged in correctional 
work. Of the latter, less than one-fifth have jobs which 
are other than custodial or administrative in nature./§. 
Justice; 
une 
/4 The President 1 s Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice; The Challenge of Crime in a 
Free Society; U.S. Government Printing Office; Washington, 
D.C.; February 1967; p. 1. 
/5 Progress Report of the Assembly Committee on 
Criminal Procedures; Op.Cit; pp. 10-18. 
/6 The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice; Op.Cit; p. 12. 
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Background 
Unlike some of the more glamorous sciences, penology 
has virtually been 11runni.ng-1n-place11 in terms of major 
progress for over two centuries. Many of our current penal 
institutions are abiding monuments to man's unwavering faith 
in the notion that incarceration can convert wrongdoers into 
citizens. Until the 18th century, criminals were locked up 
for the purpose of retribution - usually torture and ex-
tinction. The evils comnitted were attributed to the in-
fluence of Satan. This primitive theology gave way to 
rationalization during the Enlightenment and the belief 
gained ground that criminals could be made to reform if the 
penalties for crimes exceeded the pleasures derived there-
from. 
American prisons began to be built in their present 
form in the late 18th century. The more advanced institu-
t i ons of the time were in Pennsylvania and New York, where 
si lence was rigorously enforced and hundreds of involuntary 
monks performed their enforced penance./7 The 19th century 
brought about an age of reform. Former beliefs gave way to 
the idea that training and education would allow the crimi-
nal to live constructively as a citizen. By the middle of 
the century, the Irish mark system, whereby points were 
awarded for good behavior, was ushered in as a humanitarian 
landmark. From then on, in most countries, confinement was 
accompanied by the expectation that time would be remitted 
from sentences for good behavior. Later, as the influence 
of the mental health movement gained favor in correctional 
circles, psychiatric evaluations were used in the hope that 
the criminals future might be more clearly predicted. 
Until the present generation of correctional manage-
ment, the warden's principal concern was to insure that in-
mates lived in peace and order within the prison and did 
not escape its confines./8 This parochial approach did 
nothing to advance the teainiques being forwarded by the 
medical, educational and social sciences in the interests 
of reconstructing convicts. As a result , prisoners kept 
order in the interests of reduci ng the discomforts of im-
prisonment. In such an atmosphere, resistance to the staff 
becomes an end in itself and prisoners who cooperate in 
staff objectives are ostracized. Survival of the individual 
in such a conmunity depends on his acceptance of antisocial 
values; few prisoners have the moral resources to withstand 
the pervasive influence of their fellow inmates' solidarity 
in opposition to staff values. 
11_ Reckless, W. C.; Op.Cit; p. 609. 
/8 Conrad, John P.;•Prisons and Prison Reform; 
Current History''; Current History, Inc. ; August 1967; 
pp. 89-91. 
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Nevertheless, some headway has been made against the 
"convict code". Gradually, the social sciences have gained 
converts through the introduction of professional medical, 
educational and social services. Indications are tnat this 
trend is flourishing, both in the United States and abroad. 
The result is a coherent correctional machine dedicated to 
the achievement of objectives rather than the management 
of a meaningless process. Much is vet to be done, however, 
the present trends in corrections give rise to some optimism 
about the moral progress of man./2_ In the final analysis, 
no prison, regardless of how generously staffed and equipped, 
can hope to be anything but a place in which men become 
worse, unless its objective is the reintegration of its in-
mates into the corrmunity. 
Discussion 
Penal le9islation in general has been based on the be-
lief that more severe penalties (longer sentences and longer 
time served in prison) deter the general population from 
coR111itting crimes and protect the corrmunity from criminals . 
The consequences of this legislative trend and its in-
fluence on parole policy have been extremely expensive. In 
California, for example, the median stay in prisons is 
thirty months, second highest of the twelve largest states 
and fifth highest in the nation. The number of state pris-
oners per 100,000 population is the highest of these states. 
The median time served in the fifty states runs from 9 
months in New Hampshire to 39 months in Hawaii. High and 
low crime rates are found at both ends of the scale. 
TABLE I 
CRIME RATE VS. TIME SERVED 
State Median Time Prisoners per Crime Rate Served Mos. 100,000 Pop. 
Pennsylvania 32.1 61. 5 856 
California 29.6 145.6 2424 
Illinois 28.6 78.4 1713 
New York 26.9 96.9 1497 
Fl orida 24.1 122.7 1927 
Ohio 24.0 111. 3 1011 
Indiana 23.8 91.9 l 166 
North Carolina 20.2 102.6 932 
Michigan 18. 1 88.5 1537 
Massachusetts 17 .9 36.3 1376 
Missouri 17.2 78.8 1540 
Texas 17 .o 123.3 1363 
/J, Conrad, John P.; The Annals; The American Academy of 
Political and Social Science; Philadelphia, Pa; January 1969; 
p. xiii. 
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The implicit as.sumpti.ons have been: the more time 
served, the more deterence, the more rehabilitation, the 
more conmunity protection. However, if lengthy fncarcera-
tion operated as a deterent,"crime rates should oe lowest 
in states where the time served 6y convicts is nighest. 
They are not. It is also significant that recidivism rates 
in all states are generally constant. The rate varies from 
10% to 15% year to year. For any large state in the nation, 
whether the median stay is long or short. it can be realis-
tically predicted that almost 50% of the criminals released 
from prisons will return to prisons within five years of re-
lease./10 These figures hardly reinforce or in any way 
supportthe notion that present day penal policy is rational . 
The State of California, which is considered one of the more 
progressive in this area, maintains one of the most expen-
sive correctiona l systems in the nati on to implement a penal 
policy of entirely unproven effectiveness./11 The annual 
costs of this system, exclusive of aid for dependent fami-
lies (17 million), is at the $600 million mark and it is 
expected to reach $900 mill ion by 1975. It is somewhat 
more than doubtful that the taxpayer is willing to maintain 
this high investment in a system because of a desire to 
punish the guilty. Additionally, since about 95% of the 
persons now in prisons will eventually be returned to the 
community, the prob 1 em of construct; ve and meaninigful re-
habilitation is urgentl/12 
The general underlyTrig premise for the new di rections 
in corrections is that crime and delinquency are symptoms 
of failures and disorganization of the community as well as 
of individual offenders. Specifically, these failures are 
viewed as depriving offenders of contact with the institu-
tions of society that are basically responsible for assuring 
the development of law abiding conduct. 
The task of corrections therefore includes building or 
rebuilding solid ties between the offender and the community, 
integrating the offender into the conmunity, restoring 
family ties and obtaining education and employment for the 
indi vidual . This not only requires efforts towards changing 
/10 Crowther, Carol; "Crimes, Penalties, and Legisla-
ture 11 ;The Annals; Op. Cit; n. 27. 
/11 Progress Report of the Assembly Committee on 
CriminaT Procedures; Op. Cit; p. 27. 
Ill Crowther, Carol; Op. Cit; p. 151. 
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tne offender, which up to now has been the theme of rehabili-
tatton, but also the mobilization and change of the conrnunfty 
and its institutions. This must 6e undertaken fn conjunction 
with the control and deterrent role of corrections as applied 
to dangerous offenders./13 
For adult felony offenders, it is practical for 60-70 per 
cent of court adjudications to favor inmediate pro6ation. A 
higher per cent can most likely be justified for juveniles. 
In practice, pro6ation grants in excess of 50 per cent are 
as high as 75 per cent successful. With more adequate com-
munity 6ased services, imnediate probation choices could 
probably be safely increased to 70 per cent. Of the remain-
ing 30 per cent requiring initial confinement, it is pro-
jected that 15 per cent could be released to conmunity-
based services within a few weeks to a few months. For this 
group, short tenn confinement might be required for estab-
lishment of some stable living and occupational base, fol-
lowing which the person could be closely supervised in a 
free comnunity status. The remaining 15 per cent appear 
to need a longer period of institutional management. This 
group would include those persons whose crimes contained 
major public danger dimensions, social outrage or chronic 
repetition unmanageable in a comnunity or semi-institutional 
status. Except for a small core of constantly dangerous 
persons - probably no more than 3 to 5 per cent - even this 
closely managed 15 per cent could be maintained in highly 
active and conmunity-involved institutions for frequent ex-
posure to the external populace./14 
In sunvnary; the trend for corrections should be to 
connect the offender with the opportunity systems of the 
comnunity and to integrate him with the socializing insti-
tutions of society. To accomplish this task corrections 
must change those systems and institutions to eliminate 
their tendency to reject him. No matter how many resources 
are provided to corrections, it cannot, by itself, solve 
the problems of reintegration - this requires the partici-
pation of the community. The problems of crime primarily 
arise in the interaction between the individual and his 
community. The solution to those problems requires a 
modification of the offenders' adaptive behavior and a sub-
stantial contribution by those responsible for the com-
munity's opportunity system./15 
/13 Moeller, H. G.; 17he Continuum of Corrections; 11 
The Annals: Op. Cit; pp. 83-84. 
/.li Burdman, Milton; 'Realism in Community-Based 
Correctional Services 11 ;The Annals; Op. Cit; p. 75. 
/15 O'Leary, Vincent;"Some Directions for Citizen 
Involvement in Corrections 11;The Annals; Op. Cit; p. 105. 
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11Correcti_ons i.nvolves the use of every 
pha~e of the science of human engfneering. 
It must be just, humane and scientific, not 
only for ordinary numan decency, but also for 
our own safety and security . It is essen-
tial to make society understand that true 
protection - lasting protection - can re-
sult only through changing attitudes, not 
changing individuals . .. 11 
JUDGE ANNA KROSS 
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AUTOMATING THE NAVY'S OFFICER 
DISTRIBUTION PROCESS 
- 1 .. 
by Vincent E. Cooke 
The author proposes that the assignment 
process of or>dering officers to their ne:ct 
duty stations be completely automated. He 
specificaZZy takes issue with the inordinate 
amount of time spent by the detailing office~ 
in manually matching officers to biZZets . 
Vincent E. COOKE, CDR, USN; A.B. in 
Sociology, LaSal e College, 1955; B. s. in 
Industrial Relations, LaSalle Col lege, 1964. 
Candidate for M.S. in Management, NPGS. 
I OBJECTIVE OF OFFICER DISTRIBUTION 
The basic objective of the officer distribution process 
. ~s to match officers possessing certain qualifications and 
experience at a demonstrated performance level with billets 
that require similar qualifications, experience and per-
formance. This objective is difficult to attain because 
often the availability of, for example, top performing 
officers may not match the availability of billets requiring 
their talents, or vice versa. Another obstacle occurs when 
the availability of the billet and officer occur simultan-
eously but the officer prefers duty in some other place. 
The ideal officer distribution match occurs when an officer 
with qualifications, experience and a particular performance 
rating requests a bi llet requiring qualifications, experience 
and an officer with a performance rating similar to his 
own in a location where the billet is available at the time 
he will be available for rotation. 
II THE EXISTING DISTRIBUTION PROCESS 
Inputs 
Inputs to the officer distribution process are pro-
vided by: the placement officer, the detaile r, the indi-
vidual officer's desires and career needs, the individual's 
performance record, the impending l:>i 11 et' s job requi're-
ments, and the desires of the impending.billet's superior 
officer . Placement officers exist for each general type 
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of duty in the Navy, for example, Vietnam, Destroyers, 
Ashore Staffs, etc. The placement officer controls ·tfle 
6illets wnich must be filled. He knows when opentngs will 
extst and he also reviews the qualtftcattons of officers 
proposed to fill the btllets. 
Tne detatler controls the avatlabiltty of offtcers. 
There are detai'lers for Captains, Commanders, Lieutenant 
Corrmanders, etc. Their function is to provide officers 
to fill the billets made availa6le by tlie placement offi"cer. 
Though the placement officer holds the Billets tnat are 
availa61e, it is the detailer who makes offi'cers avaflable 
and subsequently-11detai'ls 11 the officer to the new 6i11et. 
Part of the responsibility of the detailer entails looking 
after the career needs of the officers whom they asstgn. 
The input provided by the individual consists of his 
preference for duty which he lists on a prescribed fonn 
called the Officer Preference Card, and ampltfies with as 
much qualifications as he desires on an attached card, or 
in letters and telephone calls to his detailer. There ts 
no constraint on the frequency of submission of the pref-
erence cards. For the officer unaware of what duty ts 
Best for him, as is often the case with junior officers, 
the detailer will attempt to detail an officer into the 
"right" billets, unless the officer strenuously objects 
and indicates that he is simply not interested in Being a 
front runner. 
Each detailer and placement officer has access to the 
officer's fitness reports which reflect his performance. 
Before detailing an officer to a prospective billet, it is 
mandatory that the detailer check the officerts past per-
fonnance in order to judge the officer's potential for 
meeting the challenge of the proposed billet. 
As an officer becomes more senior, the billets he 
seeks begin to demand certain previous qualifications or 
experience. As an example, command of a destroyer requires 
that the nominees should have served a tour as executive 
officer afloat. Similar rules obtain for duty ashore and 
if the candidate does not possess the prerequisite expert-
ence he may be unacceptable for the billet. In some cases 
the placement officer defers to the judgment of the billet ' s 
superior officer and permits him to make a selection among 
a list of nominees. This is a privilege usually accorded 
only to very senior officers or where a very sensitive 
billet is involved. 
Outputs 
The outputs of the officer distribution process are 
essentially three: providing an officer who can be ex-
pected to satisfy the llillet requi"rements; acconmodating 
the indtvidual 1 s preference; and, looking after the indi-
vidual's career requirements. Tftougfi t is difficult 
during the assignment process, especially witft junfor offi-
cers, to predict success in the ~illet, tfte ultimate goal 
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in officer assi_gnment i~ to provide an officer whose past 
performance indi_cates that be will be able to meet the 
challenges offered i.n the new 6illet. This is espectally 
critical in detaining the unrestricted line offtcer since 
rarely is he ordered tnto a billet very simtlar to nis last 
one. Normally, the detailer can only look at an offi"cer's 
past performance in meettng new challenges, and tn dis-
charging varied responsi6ilities, and from those, make a 
guess that the officer will continue to demonstrate the 
same kind of performance. 
Probably the most di"fficult of the outputs is to com-
pletely accomnodate the officer's preference. By this I 
mean assigning him to the billet he wants in the locale of 
his choice. All things being equal, more often than not, 
and especially in the more senior grades, timing is the 
strongest factor militating against the area choice. 
Satisfying the officer 1 s career requirements is 
probably less diff i cult than comi'ng up with the other out-
puts. This is because career requirements are rather 
6roadly defined and the real key to promotion is perform-
ance. Nevertheless, there are some reference points in 
the career pattern and these are discovered by examining 
the career patterns of Admiral selectees. In general, 
service on a joint staff, duty in Washington, and success-
ful completion of a major co111T1and tour are three of the 
most consistent requirements. Sequential phasing through 
certain general kinds of billets is usually required prior 
to being ordered into one of these billets and this estab-
lishes what has come to be known as career patterns. Pro-
vided the officer is not tied to one locale these career 
milestones are not difficult to attain. 
Manufacturing Process for Orders 
The manufacturing process for a set of orders begins 
with the placement officer who is in control of the billets. 
The currently installed computer system periodically pro-
duces an output which advises the placement officer that 
certain billets will need replacements within a given period. 
The placement officer posts these billets with the appro-
priate rank desk, or detailer, in the form of posting slips. 
The detailer, who controls the availability of officers, 
matches those qualified officers who will be available for 
rotation coincidental with the availability of the billet. 
These matched officers are nominated to the placement offi-
cer who finally decides on their acceptability for the 
billet. If they are accepted, the detailer is notified and 
he initiates the details involved in actual ly writing orders 
for the officer to fill the billet. The placement officer 
then makes the incumbent officer available via availa6ility 
notices to the appropriate rank detailer. Certain factors 
tmpinge on the detatlers and placement officers which dis-
rupt this smooth flow. The officer himsel f may simply 
change his mind or the billet's superior may reject endless 
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list~ of candidate~; or very ~enior officers Jllaf se.ek con-
si_derati_on for top performi.ng loyal suhordinates; or th.e 
placement officers may recei.ve emergency requests for offt-
cers far in excess of the numbers planned le.g. Vtetnam tn-
country bui_ldup). 
Before the detatler provides any nominee to the place-
ment officer, the officers preference card, career needs 
and fitness reports are matched against the 6illet require-
ments. Thts matching process, though the keystone of tfie 
whole system, is probably the most time consuming phase of 
the process and, as I will show later, is a candidate for 
automaUon. 
Feedback and Control 
No positive feedback exists in the system as it now 
functions. An officer may or may not be happy with his 
orders but unless he is violently opposed to them, which 
is not often the case, there is very little feed6ack to the 
Bureau of Naval Personnel reporting on the reaction of an 
offi'cer to his orders. 
The only feedback from the officer's superior is via 
the officer's fitness report,unless the officer is totally 
unsatisfactory and requires relief. Though desireable, it 
is very improbable that a detailer can afford the time to 
get back and check the fitness reports written on all offi-
cers which he assigned in the last year to determine whether 
he made good or bad choices. 
Since feedback is so weak, control might therefore be 
expected to be even weaker. However, because of the amount 
of personal attention given to each match of officer to 
billet there is a significant amount of control over who 
gets which billet. · At least four officers may be involved 
in routinely matching officers to billets (the assistant 
detailer, the detailer, the assistant placement offfceraand 
the placement officer) and, where an officer is being as-
signed a command, many more officers, up to a formal 
screening board will be involved. 
III EVALUATION OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM 
There is an abundance of information available to the 
detailer on each officer. Furthermore, the information 
retrieval system on each officer is acceptably fast, accurate 
and efficient. This also holds true for information on the 
billets. The existing information system used in matchfng 
officer and billet fulfills the objectives of the officer 
distribution system. The computerized data bank at the 
Bureau can rapidly provide historical information, qualifi-
cations and correct statisttcs on any officer, with the 
exception of his fttness report perfonnance marks. 
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But, there are disadvantages in this system. An offi-
cer may destre a parttcular 6i1let tn a specific locale 
but Because his projected rotatfon date is outside of 
the dates of officers available for the bil let, he will 
not be considered. Then another qualified officer who 
didn't want the bfllet or didn't lfke the locale, may be 
assigned. Therefore, because of poor timing and an un-
willingness to gap or overlap billets, two officers are 
unhappy, but the needs of the service predominated. This 
system invariably leads to the needs of the servfce pre-
dominating more often than may be necessary. One wonders 
how many times t he 11right 11 man for the job may have been 
on the next card but was overlooked because he was beyond 
the availability cut-off point. 
The detailer spends an inordinate amount of time 
manually matching billets and officers. Some will argue 
that the detai ler can't spend too much time assuring the 
best kind of match. However, I feel that this matching 
can be done better and faster via computer~ thereby free-
ing the detailer to spend more time in giving officers 
under their cognizance more personal attention. 
One main advantage of the current system is the posi-
tive assurance that all officers are being personally 
managed. This has a lot of appeal especially consfdering 
the impersonal treatment many of us have received from 
computerized accounting and billing departments. But, 
assignment of officers by a computer does not have to 
mean that we are receiving impersonal attention. On the 
contrary, later paragraphs will show that through automa-
tion, more personal attention, rather than less, is pos-
sible. 
IV THE AUTOMATED PROCESS 
Under an automated distribution system the flow of 
orders need not change at all. If automation is properly 
implemented the system will continue to function as before 
except some, if not all, of the steps in the process will 
be automated. It is within the state of the computer art 
to automate the entire officer distribution system up to 
and including actually writing the orders. To accomplish 
this feat is a matter of programming a computer which has 
sufficient capacity to store all of the inputs that must 
be considered in manufacturing a set of orders. The pro-
granming task is difficult, but not impossible. Though 
total automation may not be capable of immediate and com-
plete attainment this should not rule out con~tderation of 
automating portions of the distribution system keeping in 
mind the long-range goal. A start has in fact been made 
with the Officer Data Card and the Posting Strips. 
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Inputs 
The inputs to the data bank are exactly the same as 
those described earlier as being used in the matching 
process. These are: 
1. the Officer Data Card; 
2. the Officer 1 s fitness reports; 
3. the Officer's preference card; 
4. all of the officer billets along with the pro-
jected rotation date of the incumbent, and the 
experience, qualifications, educational level 
and demonstrated performance level required of 
prospective candidates for the billet; 
5. idealized officer career patterns; and 
6. enroute schools' convening dates, curriculum 
and quotas. 
Outputs 
If the computer had sufficient capacity to store all 
of the foregoing data along with the appropriate logic 
capability and assuming that programming was thoroughly 
undertaken, the computer output could be a complete set 
of orders ready for mailing. An alternative output would 
be a priority listing of nominees for each forthcoming 
billet. Hereafter the former system will be referred to 
as the Fully Automatic Transfer System for Officers (FATSO), 
and the latter system will be referred to as the Semi-
Automatic Transfer System for Officers (SATSO). FATSO 
would perform all of the matching and judgment now per-
formed by the detailer. The detailer would simply accept 
or reject the computer output based on any whim, last 
minute request by the officer concerned, or any other in-
formation possessed by the detailer and unknown to the 
computer. SATSO would provide a priority listing of can-
didates for a billet from which the detailer would make a 
choice, whereupon the nominee and billet match would fol-
low all of the manual steps in the current process. 
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Control 
All of the control currently exercised by the detailer 
could still be available under an automated system. With 
SATSO. the computer is simply progra111T1ed to perform all 
of the manual searching for candidates that was formerly 
done by the detailer. The detailer can still compare 
nominees with their fitness reports, as can the placement 
officer. and accept or reject candidates on whatever basis 
they are currently employing to make their judgments. 
Even with FATSO, the detailer would not lose control of 
the assignemnt process. Here, the orders are completely 
manufactured by the computer. But, before mailing, each 
set of orders would be screened by the detailer. At this 
time the detailer would subjectively · evaluate the computer 
decision, taking into consideration the officer's previous 
performance, the oillet's requirements and the officer's 
preference. This procedure is accomplished now by each 
detailer but it is performed in order to produce a set of 
orders. With FATSO it would be done to evaluate and con-
trol the computer output and would require considerably 
l ess time than it does now to match and manufacture the 
orders. Some will contend that under this system the 
detailer could easily become too busy to carefully evaluate 
the computer output. This is undoubtedly true and pro-
posals to avoid this temptation will be propounded under 
the section covering Feedback. 
Conceptual Automated Flow Process 
Each officer's historical and statistical information 
is already part of an automated data bank. Billet availa-
bilities along with the requirements of the billet are 
also in the same data bank. Officer fitness reports would 
have to be adapted or transcribed into a format which 
would permit entry into the data base. The fitness report 
form currently in use permits a considerable amount of ob-
jective marking which should facilitate its use in an 
automated system. If it is considered that the marking 
factor spaces are sufficient for assignment purposes then 
the current fitness report forms could simply be trans-
cribed onto an acceptable card in order that the computer 
could read the data. The fitness report form signed by 
the superior would be retained to be used by selection 
boards. 
The Officer Preference Card could also be transcribed 
onto a form acceptable to the computer, but just like the 
fitness reports, could be retained as written by the offi-
cer. This would provide the detailer with a means to en-
sure that the computer is performing up to expectations 
as the detailer checks the output of the computer (the 
transfer order) against the officer's requests and past 
perfonnance. 
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finally, all of the schools to wnich officers are 
ordered enroute to thetr next duty statton would haye to fie 
entered into the data hank. It would be necessary-to in-
clude the lack of qualtftcatton or e.xpertence that eac~ 
school is expected to substttute for quotas ayatlable. 
lengtn of course, coyening dates, etc. The computer would 
be progranmed for the quotas at these schools set astde 
for Bupers and would fie progranmed to assure that tt does 
not exceed the quota limitation without warning the con-
trol personnel. 
The most difficult evolution is writing the program 
that w111 use a 11 of the required inputs and produce the 
correct output, the officer's orders to his next duty 
station. This program would begin by asking the computer 
to provide transfer orders for all billets which will need 
filling in a specific time period. The computer would be 
prograrrmed to first, identify the billets. The next step 
would be to identify the requirements of each billet. The 
computer would next search its data bank for the officers 
due for rotation during the subject time frame. It would 
then determine which officers are qualified for the billets 
and which have shown a preference for the billet. Finally, 
if there are available officers who prefer the billet but 
do not have all of the qualifications the computer would 
search its enroute school data to determine if the neces-
sary qualifications or experience could be met through 
attendance at a school. The computer would then write the 
officer's orders which would be presented to the detailer 
along with the officer's fitness reports, preference card, 
data card and a brief of the billet requirement. The de-
tailer would assure that the computer wrote a set of orders 
which comply with current policy and needs of the service. 
As long as this phase is not overlooked, the automated 
process is every bit as personal as the existing system. 
Automation has simply accomplished all of the searching 
and matching formerly required of the detailer. 
The two most complex prograrrming steps would be match-
ing the officer to the billet and determining the enroute 
schools required. These are also the most burdensome for 
the detailer under the present manual system. Therefore, 
one shouldn't expect the programming of these phases to oe 
a simple, straightforward task. It has taken years for the 
present manual system to evolve and for the computer to be 
as effective in this matching process as the officers now 
doing it, the prograJTlller must be able to determine every 
nuance of the task performed by the detailer. 
The SATSO system is simply a modified version of FATSO. 
Two of its fnputs are already in the data bank, i.e., the 
Officer Data Card and the billet avaflabflittes. The 
third input is the Officer Preference Card. Using these 
inputs the computer cou.ld be asked to provfde a prtority 
listing of candidates possessing the requisite qualtft-
cations and/or experience, who will either be available 
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for as~ignment during the time frame required or who have 
asked for such dut,y. SATSO eliminates all of the. manual 
searcn for qualtfted offtcers. rt no officer preferred 
the btllet, SATSO would he capable of dtsclostng how far 
into the non-avai"lafile. offtcers the detafler would have to 
go in order to ffnd a qualified officer who prefers the 
billet. The detatler would extract the preferred nominee 
from the list and dectde if he meets all of tfie Billet re-
quirements and select any enroute scnools deemed necessary. 
Feedback. 
Feedback from both the assigned officers and thefr 
superiors is necessary tn order to determine how well the 
detafltng process fs working. An effective feedback system 
would provide such information from the assigned officer 
as: satisfaction with billet assigned, satisfaction with 
locale, challenge of the billet compared to expectations, 
facility with which he discharges his responsibilities, 
etc. The superior might report on his satisfaction with 
the officer that was assigned. This would be of special 
interest in those cases where a billet supposedly required 
a 4.0 officer but a 3.0 officer was assigned. Considera-
tion might then be given to reevaluating the requirements 
of the billet. This feedback would ultimately find its way 
to a control group whose functions will be discussed later. 
V EVALUATION OF THE AUTOMATED SYSTEM 
Advantages 
The most significant advantage of either FATSO or 
SATSO is the time it gives the detailer for more effective 
execution of his responsibilities. He will be able to 
spend a considerable amount of time counseling officers on 
the telephone and in writing meaningful responses to letter 
queries . Most important he will be in positive control of 
the detailing process and will be able to get off the 
treadmill existence which seems to be the case now. 
The FATSO system could be programmed with such refine-
ments that would enable each detailer to give fairly accurate 
probabilities of exactly what an officer could expect for 
duty when he is next assigned. This could be accomplished 
from the detailer's desk with remote data links to the 
central processing unit and the computer would be able to 
provide instant and accurate response to such questions as 
to the number of Destroyer C.O. billets available in San 
Diego 1n four months and the number of offfcers qualified 
for such duty who have asked for a Destroyer and wi"l be 
avaflable for asstgnment. The detailer does not have to 
co!llTli't h.imself, But at least he has all of tfie facts and 
can be very responstve to telephone querfes. Su6sequently, 
if an offfcer isn't assigned to any of ~is preferred choices, 
the detailer will have plenty of tfme and sufficient tnfor-
mation to explain exactly the reasons an officer didn't get 
what he asked for. 
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Anticipated Difficulties 
A complete list of anticipated difficulties simply 
isn't possible at this time or in the confines of this 
short paper. Nevertheless, the toughest hurdles deserve 
mentioning. I believe these to be: 
1. Development of the Project Task Force to develop 
the system. 
2. Funding the operation. 
3. The progra1T111ing volved in substituting enroute 
schools for experience or qualifications defi-
ciencies. 
4. The tremendous initial data collection. 
VI IMPLEMENTATION 
Effective implementation of this plan demands first a 
project task force. Obviously the task force will include 
programmers and data technicians. Of equal and perhaps 
greater importance is that the working level composition 
of this task force should include representatives from: 
the Officer Distribution Section; the sections responsible 
for the actual order writing; the sections which are most 
familiar with the enroute schools available; the fitness 
report section; and, those sections responsible for deter-
mining billet job requirements. There should be a small 
group of perhaps 2 or 3 members providing managerial and 
policy guidance to the working level. This group would 
include the actual project task force manager, an outside 
system consultant and the Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel. 
The task force manager must be a man who is convinced of 
the system's worth and possesses the skill and determina-
tion to see the project through. The outside consultant 
provides objective advice to the manager and acts as a 
catalyst for the group. He is a person the manager can 
bounce ideas off and get impartial help. The Deputy Chief 
of Naval Personnel provides the command support to the 
project. 
The task group will have to study the capability and 
capacity of the existing computer hardware. If it appears 
insufficient it will have to examine the feasibility of 
purchasing additional equipment. 
New fitness reports and officer preference forms may 
be necessary. In any event, consideration for developing 
new forms will be a part of the implementation. It may 
be feasible to manufacture a form that can be used by the 
computer directly. Or, it may require transcription at 
the Bureau in order to get the information into the com-
puter. 
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The PERT scheduling technique should be used from the 
outset in order to control all of the elements of implemen-
tation. A most important consideration will be the trial 
period and trial runs. During this time both the present 
system and the automatic system will be operating together 
as the automatic system is evaluated against the manual sys-
tem. This may be a lengthy period and if anything, per-
sonnel requirements will increase during this dual opera-
tion period. It should be noted at the outset that the 
automatic system is not being designed to eliminate people. 
It is being installed to enable the detailer to exercise 
greater and more eff icient control over the distribution 
process . 
The task force should determine just how much of the 
system should be immediately automated. SATSO could be im-
plemented first and the task force might continue develop-
ing FATSO. Before FATSO is completely ready there may be 
other intermediate steps which can be programned to operate 
automatically. It doesn't all have to be done at once. 
The working level of the task force should develop 
into a Control group. This Control group would concern 
itself with such things as revising billet requirements, 
changing the enroute school information as the fleet 
tra i ning centers change the available courses, receiving 
and applying the feedback information from the assigned 
officers and their superiors. In general, their responsi-
bilities would revolve around seeking more ways to make 
the assignment of officers more efficient and thefr task 
would be that of updating the data bank. 
Concluding then, I believe that an automated officer 
distribution system can work and I think that it is im-
portant that we begin to do more than simply argue, or 
think about it. Whether it is recognized as such or not, 
a start has been made with the Officer Data Card and the 
billet availabilities. We need to press on, exploring 
ways in which we can make this new management ool, the 
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THE WEAPONS CULTURE, Ralpn E. Lapp; W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 
New York., 1968. . -
·• •,· · · revi.ewed by F. P. Zmorzensk_i , LCDR, ~SN 
·· '"' In this book, Dr. Lapp, an eminent nuclear physicist, 
has written his expose of our so-called weapons culture. 
In it he claims that advanced weapons tecfmology and .the ; 
importarrce of the defense industry have so permeated and 
become ingrained in our American way of life that we cannot 
control .the upward spiral of defense spending. He begins 
oy' assailing the "military-industrial complex", ·expands his 
remarks to include the "military-industrial-congressional 
complex" and finally escalates his attack to include the 
11milttary-industrial-pol itical-scientific comp.lex". · 
His premise is based on the interplay and interface 
between: 
1} The military--who never have enough and can 
always come up with a new threat to justify 
a promising weapons system. 
2) Industry--which wants a profit and in many 
cases has the government as its sole market. 
3) Politicians--who are highly motivated to 
obtain defense contracts for their consttu-
ents. 
4) Scientists--who have become dominated by the 
military and enamored with defense R & D 
funds. 
5) The public--a large percentage of which are 
dependent on DOD for their pay checks and 
who look on missi le and bomber gaps as com-
petitive games in which we must prove our 
nation •s superiority. 
In the course of his book, Dr. Lapp provides a fairly 
detailed account of how Red Chi na became a nuclear power 
and how the nuclear power for peace program, primari ly 
through the constructton of electricity generating plants, 
may provide many of the sma11er nations of the world with 
atomic weapons by giving them a source of nuclear raw 
materials. He spends many pages expoundt ng the potnt of 
view that our atomic deterrent forces and proposed ABM 
system may tn actual t ty- be provoking our opponents rather 
than deterring them. 
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During his di.ssertati'on, Dr. Lapp reviews the cause 
and effect of our defense spending from the Eisenhower 
administration on through the birth of the present ABM 
conflict. Many of hts positions and arguments are shallow 
and deci dedl,y one sided, but he. does hia ke a few good 
points. 
On the whole, I would say that this book does not live 
up to the in-depth analysts of our socfety promfsed by its 
tttle or the glowing description contained on the book 
jacket. I would, however, reconunend it as an excellent 
primer for the arguments thrown at us on the non-milftary 
cocktail circuft. 
About the Author 
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ment general staff from 1946-47. He then became the head 
of the nuclear physics branch of the Office of Naval Re-
search and since 1950 has served as a consulting physicist 
for the Nuclear Science Service. Recently, he became a 
founder of Quadri-Science, lnc., in Washington, D.C. 
His articles and lectures on radioactive fallout and 
radiation hazards have had national and international in-
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MANAGEMENT AND MACHIAVELLI. AN INQUIRY INTO THE POLITICS 
OF CORPORATE LIFE, Anthony Jay; New York: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston. 
reviewed by Ray Amor, CDR, USN 
Mr. Jay's central theme is that the new science of 
management is, in fact, only a continuation of the old art 
of government. He bases this claim on the fact that when 
you study management and political history, you begin to 
realize that you are really studying two branches of the 
same subject. As Mr. Jay puts it, he was reading 
Machiavelli's The Prince when he suddenly encountered a 
sentence that seemed like a direct answer to a question 
he had pondered the previous day--are there guiding prin-
ciples for taking over finns? After reading the Machiavelli 
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passage, Mr. Jay concludes that the guiding principles 
after a take-over is to either warmly welcome or sack the 
senior men in the taken-over firm. Thus, the style of the 
book is set. By continued and repeated use of analogies, 
Mr. Jay suggests the idea that there are parallels between 
management of modern corporation and the governments of 
both kingdoms and nations. The author has a witty style 
and each chapter could probably be a self-sufficient, al-
though sketchy, essay. Probably what is most important 
is the method and approach used by the author, not the 
depth or detail in which each topic was covered. 
The inspection of the work itself suggests that it is 
of some value to a management student or practicing manager. 
The book was first printed in 1967 and thus the date im-
plies that it is current in terms of known management 
theory. It treats the subject l ightly, in a happy mood. 
As a reference work it has its weakness; it has been written 
to be read. Consequently, while keeping the reader's 
interest by repeated use of analogies and observations, 
or by involving well known corporationst the author has a 
proclivity for leaving out details. This does not suggest, 
however, that the author has a tendency to arrive at con-
clusions in spite of evidence to the contrary. 
In one section of the book there is a lack of thor-
oughness and an omi ssion of an important consideration. 
Mr. Jay states that power lies in the acceptance of au-
thority by others. This is generally regarded by scholars 
of management as C. I Barnard's acceptance theory. How-
ever9 many experts in the field of management subscribe to 
the formal authority theory; Mr. Jay makes no reference to 
it. 
Along the way, the author draws an analogy between 
internal wrangles and strife of a company and a kingdom 
that expends its energies on a full-blown baronial war. 
In shortt he points out that the energies absorbed by 
baronial war should have been diverted into sales and pro-
duction. This method of writing is very interesting but 
uses much space and time to point out a relatively simple 
concept. However, the reader finds an otherwise dry sub-
ject quite lively and entertaining . 
The author emphasizes the importance of creativity 
and extols the results of creative managers. Creativity, 
he points out, is highly quenchable and claims it is not 
surprising to find college graduates unable to do creative 
original work. Mr. Jay continues to emphasize the need 
for creative leaders throughout several chapters of his 
book. This book is reconmended pleasure reading for 
managers in industry and students of management. 
About the Author 
Anthony Jay is a graduate of Cambridge University and 
a former executive producer with BBC Television Service. 
In 1965, Mr. Jay formed his own management consultant 
finn and is currently head of that British corporation. 
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